Few can claim greater influence on Western political theory than Augustine of Hippo. His letters, treatises, and monumental City of God have developed theories of justice and community, influencing the roles of church and state ever since. He lays the foundation for modern understandings of individual rights, political liberalism, and secularity. While the terms “rights,” “liberalism,” and “state” are foreign to his vernacular, Augustine’s distinction between the earthly city of man and the heavenly city of God provide the framework in which these concepts hold together.
In this essay, I turn my attention to perspectives on the common good and look for an Augustinian conception of two overlapping cities and their respective definitions of the common good. Grasping the responsibility of the individual in pursuing the common good provides insight into one’s relationship to the state and is essential for anyone within a society whose values fall short of their own. Augustine’s two cities share a common desire to encourage and facilitate the pursuit of eudaimonia for their citizens. Augustine does not rely on the state to promote eudaimonia, but encourages its pursuit by seeking heavenly virtue within the polis.
Different Worlds; Same Problems
The twentieth-century surge in Augustinian political studies, appears anachronistic.[1] An African bishop, caught in a dying empire between late antiquity and medieval scholasticism, seems a strange voice for our time. But as Patrick Deneen notes, “Augustine’s cynical yet emphatic commitment to his crumbling society cuts through the modern oscillations between extreme political pessimism and overweening utopianism.”[2] After the fall of Nazi Germany, Hannah Arendt described her condition as “living in a gap between past and future…between the times.”[3] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Jean Bethke Elshtain claimed, “We are plunged into a deepening gloom. Things were supposed to be better, different somehow than this.”[4] More recently, Patrick Deneen has bemoaned the “pall that has fallen over liberal democracies and the rise of nationalist and even racialist politics.”[5] Each of these watched as cities crumbled around them. Each turned to Augustine to strike a middle path between despairing cynicism and unrealistic utopian dreams. Augustine is neither despairing nor naïve; rather, he holds a stoic indifference to current political collapses and a Platonic hope in a divine peace.[6]
The expanse between Augustine’s world and ours is vast. Writing in a monastic community on the fringe of the declining Roman empire, he had neither sense of the modern nation-state nor of our unwavering adherence to natural individual rights. As Peter Brown notes, “Augustine experiences government as a local city-state in an outlying region of the empire, with cultures and priorities that often differed from that of the far-off emperor. Thus, when Augustine speaks of the polis, he speaks of those in the North-African town in which he lives, not of the state as modern readers might conceive it today.”[7] Nonetheless, in this essay I use “state” to signify the government itself, and I use “polis” and “society” interchangeably to signify that group of individuals living in a common place under one government.
In our post-Lockean perspectives, it is difficult to imagine a world without the presupposition of individual liberties and rights.[8] We have Augustine to thank for this.[9] Augustine follows Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, who focus on political animals and depict a society composed of an interdependent obligation to provide justice for the whole.[10] Augustine challenges this by conceiving of a spiritual individual whose aims and values differ from others within his society. His clarity amid political tensions remains a guide through the business of politics, and urges not the love of one’s state, but of one’s neighbor. It is not surprising then, that in our current climate of political unrest, many find Augustine’s work relevant.
Augustine differs from his political precursors by distinguishing between the city of man and the city of God. While Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero concern themselves with the development of the just state, Augustine distinguishes the aims of the church and the state. He identifies Christians as citizens of the city of God who happen to live among the citizens of the city of man.[11] The two cities necessarily interact, but have distinct ends. This distinction allows Augustine to develop a system for individuals to pursue varying theological convictions while still submitting to the authority of the state. One must note, however, that Augustine often depicts the city of man in symbolic contexts. As such, his antagonism toward the spiritual darkness of the state does not always translate to antagonism toward the state itself.[12] Thus, he may reject citizenship within the city of man, yet still submit to his earthly governors. Likewise, he may reject the teleological aims of this city, but still seek its good.
The Common Goods
In rendering Augustine’s Latin into English, “the common good” denotes several terms, including bonum commune, res communis, res publica, or communis utilitas.[13] Augustine’s understanding differs from typical modern conceptions of the common good, such as that offered by John Finnis: “a set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the values for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other in a community.”[14] It is the phrase “reason to collaborate with each other” which is relevant. Modern thinkers tend to conceive of the common good as a shared utility, which enables members of a community to seek their own aims. Medieval thinkers, however, assumed the members of a community shared a common aim, which they pursued in political life.[15] The common good was not a system in which to pursue one’s end, but the end itself.
Central to Augustinian political thought is his conception of the city of God and the city of man. This breaks with classical writers to define citizens by their desires, rather than their current government. Citizens of the city of God share a common love of God. Citizens of the city of man share a love of self.[16] Augustine defines a true city as “a gathering of a multitude of rational beings united in fellowship by sharing a common love of the same things.”[17] The distinct aims of the two cities may both be considered “common goods” but are necessarily incommensurable. However, the two cities currently share the same space. In seeking a common good within this heterogenous polis, one must find overlap between the ends of the two cities.
I turn first to the city of man and its classical aim of pursuing happiness through the development of virtue. I then consider the city of God and its aim to pursue happiness through the enjoyment of God. I identify their differences in both defining and pursuing happiness. Last, I argue that both cities share a common interest in promoting happiness, or eudaimonia, in their citizens, and identify the overlapping methodology for pursuing such aims.
The city of man bears two forms: the spiritual, which represents the sinful society of fallen men refusing to turn to God, and the physical, which represents the governments of earth seeking justice in a non-theistic manner.[18] It is this physical sense which concerns us. The city of man traces its roots from Cain, passing through Plato and Aristotle. In determining the aims of the city of man, I focus on Aristotle’s system of eudaimonism and government which was dominant in Augustine’s day and provides the best foil for his work.[19]
Aristotle claims that society itself exists prior its citizens, since no one can live a natural life without interpersonal relationships. Humans possess natural inclinations toward private relationship, and these relations form the state.[20] For this reason, societies cannot exist as exclusively public. Rather, individual loves and friendships determine the nature of the polis.[21] The city forms from the ground up, not by tyrannically imposed directives.[22] This is not to say the city of man is a literal democracy, as it may take any structure. However, the actual political life is not determined by potentate, but by citizens. To determine the nature of the state, one must consider the nature of the individual.
The classical understanding of the individual is that of a rational, political animal.[23] Aristotle notes that reason is the essential, distinguishing function of a human.[24] Just as the function of a good harpist is to play well, the function of the good human is this activity of the soul that involves reason.[25] Additionally, Aristotle comments, “man is by nature a political animal, and a man that is by nature and not merely by fortune citiless, is either low in the scale of humanity or above it.”[26] Man takes pleasure in the unimpeded activity of his nature. [27] In his natural state, every man desires happiness. Attaining eudaimonia, therefore, requires the exercise of reason and politics. Reason facilitates the individual’s move from his untutored to his happy state and political engagement is essential for this.[28] He notes, “the impulse to form a partnership of [a political] kind is present in all men by nature; but the man who first united people in such a partnership was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is the best of the animals when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and justice.”[29] As a uniquely rational, political animal, man achieves eudaimonia through a rational pursuit of the virtuous life within society.
The greatest city of man is thus one dedicated to the reasoned development of virtue in its citizens. While such a utopia has yet to exist, the ideal city of man will take its conception of the common good from this shared desire of its individuals.[30] However, while all men seek the same telos, the pursuit of happiness through rational habituation of virtues, they do not share one collective aim. The individual’s aim is his own pursuit of happiness, not the happiness of his neighbor.[31] The common good of the city of man is then not eudaimonia itself, but those facilities and freedoms which enable the individual to pursue it. This includes the polis itself, as well as other goods which enable the pursuit of eudaimonia.[32] Aristotle suggests goods such as basic education, programs for moral development, common facilities like public baths, meeting places, and courts, and laws, peace, and friendships.[33] While Aristotle retains notions of private property, he advocates for services provided to the public which enable the pursuit of eudaimonia. Though he presumes only a few will attain eudaimonia, the common good must be for the good of all, since each individual depends on the good of the polis.[34] The common good for the city of man is that which facilitates the pursuit of eudaimonia within each member of the society.
Since citizen’s seek their own happiness, they are apt to craft subjective definitions and prioritizations of the virtues. Thus, governments must decide what values to facilitate and promote in its citizens. As Mary Keys notes, “The theorist stopping at the level of value pluralism has not dug deeply enough into the meaning and measures of our moral experiences.”[35] One must make concessions if conflicting deep beliefs are to coexist in harmony, but this requires a trade-off greater than what one sacrifices. Aristotle claims that the utility of political relationships towards developing virtues justifies this sacrifice.[36] Political engagement is necessary to develop mutually beneficial goods. The state must identify these goods and promote them.[37] The state must make some normative claims concerning the nature of virtue itself and install facilities to pursue it.
Aristotle’s state does not extend an impartial invitation to pursue virtue however one pleases. The state itself must have some conception of the common good and instill that conception in its people. Whether by philosopher kings as Plato envisioned, or by democratic vote, the state bears the weight of both determining and enforcing the means to the common good.[38] Quickly, this state becomes not only very important, but very powerful. If the state can successfully determine and facilitate happiness in its people, utopia is at hand.[39] It is against this façade of an ever-nearing utopia that Augustine warns.
Augustine’s Common Good.
Like Aristotle, Augustine develops an ethic of seeking eudaimonia. He charts a very different path to it. Rather than pursuing eudaimonia through reason, Augustine seeks it through the enjoyment of God. In this pursuit, the common good remains essential, but the state is of little benefit. Augustine believes the common good builds on the individual and their families, but does not actualize into a political system which facilitates the pursuit of eudaimonia. He remains skeptical about the state’s ability to bring happiness to its people. Instead, Augustine suggests one ought to pursue eudaimonia through the love of God and submit to earthly authority while promoting Christian accounts of prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice.[40]
Augustine’s approach mirrors Aristotle’s: he identifies a function which distinguishes mankind from other living things. In his earlier writings, he follows the Platonic tradition of emphasizing rational soul as this function, but in his mature works he recognizes that even the rational soul must be perfected by something higher: either wisdom or the divine.[41] If not for his theism, he might come to agree with Aristotle and claim that practicing virtue perfects rationality. However, because of his belief in an eternal soul and his emphasis on the fallen will, human capabilities fall short of such a project.[42] While humans are unique in their rationality, the highest function of the soul is not reason, but the enjoyment of the divine.[43]
Two themes are central to Augustine’s ethics: love and happiness. The aim of love is to attain happiness, as love is man’s movement toward unity with and enjoyment of the divine.[44] This is not to say that love is a means to a teleological end, but that love of God is this very end itself. His framework is distinctly eudaimonistic.[45] Like Aristotle, Augustine claims that all humans seek happiness by perfecting the highest function of the soul, but thinks this occurs through love, not rationality.[46]
Hannah Arendt identifies three uses of love in Augustine’s writings: love as a desire of happiness, the love between God and man, and the love between fellow humans.[47] Augustine argues that since all men seek happiness, they love those things which make them happy. Man attains happiness by possessing a good that he cannot lose. Thus, any temporary thing, even virtue cannot bring happiness. Since both the soul and God are immutable, one may find happiness in the eternal state of the soul loving God.[48]
Augustine distinguishes proper loves by the object of the love. A bad love, or cupiditas, is love that is disproportionate to its object: either too great a love for an unworthy object, or an insufficient love for an object which deserves more. A good love, or caritas, is proper love directed at a proper object. Thus, the highest love is full enjoyment of God: the greatest love for the greatest object.[49] All other loves follow in the appropriate order: love of neighbor, love of self, and love of one’s body. One rightly seeks eudaimonia by loving these things in their proper order.[50]
Man need not be indifferent to earthly goods, but must love lesser goods as means to greater goods. He distinguishes between the use (uti) of an object of love and the enjoyment (frui) of an object. Since all things find their goodness in God, it is inappropriate to enjoy them for their own sake. Rather, one ought to use lesser goods to enjoy God. This enjoyment of the highest good draws on Platonic ethics, which emphasize enjoyment of the divine.[51] Augustine argues for love teleologically. All loves must seek the proper end. As Aristotle claims that all actions ought to lead to a development of virtue through reason, Augustine claims that all loves ought to lead to the enjoyment of God.[52]
The primacy of the enjoyment of God in Augustinian eudaimonism results in an unusual normative ethic. He must deny the value of temporal goods solely for their own sake. One does not love their neighbor for their neighbor’s sake. The love of neighbor must be a meansto one’s end. To love one’s neighbor is to love them as images of God, thus using them to enjoy God more.[53] Thus, one ought to enjoy God on earth through the proper love of temporal things.[54]
Augustine is less concerned with cultivating virtue through reason and instead focuses on contemplation of the divine.[55]Unlike Aristotle, who argues ethics is a shift from human potential to actualization, Augustine argues that man currently lacks the capacity to love rightly, and must settle for an attempt.[56] While one will love properly and attain eudemonia in the next life, this is impossible on earth.[57] Happiness on earth is only a shadow of eternal happiness.[58] In this way Augustine admits eudaimonia is beyond the capacity of the fallen human soul. Thus, he denies Aristotle’s claims that one can cultivate the dispositions of the soul through reason and advocates for a theocentric view of formation, relying on the divine to facilitate happiness.[59]
Both Aristotle and Augustine seek eudaimonia, but the differences in their metaphysical analysis of the functions of the soul result in drastically different accounts of what eudaimonia is, when one attains it, and how one should seek it. Aristotle focuses on man’s natural reason to articulate a eudaimonism of virtuous dispositions, attained at the end of this life and sought by habitual practice. Augustine focuses on man’s eternal soul to articulates a eudaimonism of the enjoyment of God, attained in eternity and sought by contemplation of the divine and properly ordered loves.
It is not surprising then, that Augustine’s conception of the common good differs substantially from Aristotle’s. Since Augustine defines a polis as a gathering of rational beings united in fellowship by sharing a common love of the same things, but does not share a common love for earthly things, the Augustinian can only participate in the common good of the state as a pilgrim on the way to his true city.[60] Citizens of the city of God share in their common desire to enjoy God.[61] Their desires are not merely similar pursuits of individual happiness, but necessarily united in a shared love of God. Happiness comes by loving one’s God and neighbor well, not from practicing virtue.[62] In the city of God, drawing on the services and facilities of a society has no effect on a man’s soul, only God does. Rather, a one who loves God contributes to the common goods of society by loving them in their proper order.
This love is an outpouring of one’s own happiness, however imperfect it may be. Michael P. Foley notes that “Augustine’s answers to the question of happiness are ultimately apolitical (in the sense that happiness is discovered to be something lying outside the polis).”[63] Happiness occurs first in one’s relation to God, and is not actualized in the polis, but in eternity. As Augustine writes “that which makes man happy is none other than the supreme good.” And later, “eternal life is the supreme good.”[64] It is only after glimpsing happiness in enjoying God that one re-engages the polis. In this, one looks not to fulfil personal or public ambition, but to share a love of wisdom with the city - a selfless and sober consideration of justice and virtue.[65]
In this pursuit, one finds commonalities between the common goods of the city of God and the city of man. Their aims are different, but their values overlap: prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. The pilgrim who finds himself happy in God ought to pursue these virtues within the polis. Of course, the Christian definitions of these virtues differ from the definitions of the government, as Augustine defines each as a turn to God:
Temperance is love giving itself entirely to that which is loved; fortitude is love readily bearing all things for the sake of the loved object; justice is love serving only the loved object, and therefore ruling rightly; prudence is love distinguishing with sagacity between what hinders it and what helps it. The object of this love is not anything, but only God, the chief good, the highest wisdom, the perfect harmony.[66]
While the Augustinian shares basic values with the city of man, he experiences them in theological terms. Because of this, some have argued that Augustine’s disposition toward the city is not in pursuing common goods through actualizing virtues, but through withdraw from political engagement.[67]
The Limits of the Common Good.
The Augustinian must admit the hope of the city of God eludes us on earth. There is a darkness that attends the life of human society.[68] Bethke Elshtain remarks, “Augustine is second to none… in cataloging the miseries attendant upon the human life, the miseries he lays on the doorstep of sin.”[69] Where fallen humans exist, utopia will not. There is a limit in both definitions of shared common goods and the governments which seek to advance it.
The primary limit to common political goods is the state’s capacity to identify them. Eric Gregory notes, “Any Augustinian - liberal or not - will be a moral realist.”[70] There are real goods to pursue, though an Augustinian cannot expect the secular state to define them as he might.[71] Those who do not love God cannot know eternal wisdom or truth.[72] There is an epistemic limitation to those with whom believers share the polis, and pluralism is out of the question, as Aristotle and Augustine both hold to incompatible metaphysical foundations for these goods.[73]
A pilgrim can ask nothing of his state, yet must still seek its good. Augustine does not suggest withdrawal from the city of man. Rather, he urges a cautious involvement with the state. One must look to it for nothing, but offer to it all he can, out of abundance of his own happiness. He notes, “The philosophers hold the view that the life of the wise man should be social, and in this we support them…heartily.”[74] He commands neither apathy nor hope towards one’s government. For though there is no common justice, one can hope for what is possible to obtain.[75] An imperfect but nonetheless real, earthly peace is possible. Peter Brown notes, “For Augustine, the saeculum is “all embracing and inescapable.”[76] The pilgrim is called not to perfection, but to relative peace in the earthly city.[77]
Since Rome cannot offer happiness or peace, the Augustinian must take his attention beyond Rome. Any state will be tempted to reign over, rather than serve, its polis. The role of a good citizen is to temper this tendency.[78] Vernonia Ogle notes that, “Although it is good to want Rome to truly prosper, idolizing Rome does not achieve this.”[79] The best thing one can do for the city of man is to look beyond it and seek eternal peace. Augustine warns, “No wisdom is true wisdom if it does not direct all its prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice towards that final state where God shall be all in all in an assured eternity and perfect peace.”[80] For this reason, Augustine suggests Christians make the best citizens. He writes, “If [all people] were to hear and embrace the Christian precepts of justice and moral virtue, the commonwealth would adorn its lands with happiness in this present life.”[81] It is the responsibility of the pilgrim on Earth to promote true Christian virtues within the polis. This responsibility is not out of a love for Rome, but a love for God and neighbor. Promoting true virtues benefits the polis by orienting its people to something other than themselves. Furthermore, this orientation aids the people in their own pursuits of cultivating virtue, by shifting their motivations from self-improvement to love. In this way, pursuing Christian happiness in society benefits not only Rome, but all its citizens.
There is a limitation to the Augustinian’s involvement within the city of man. He must respect that the polis cannot see the common good as he does. He should seek true justice, but respect the authority of a lesser justice of the state. He should advocate for heavenly virtues wherever possible, but not impose them on man.[82] Augustine takes such an approach to capital punishment, acknowledging its legitimacy on Earth, yet opposing its use. He writes that rulers “represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, ‘You shall not kill,’”[83] yet he urges Donatus, “Forget you have the power of capital punishment… spare the lives of the men on whose behalf we ask God to grant them repentance.”[84] In this, Augustine models an adherence to divine values, but respect for their limitations under the authority of man.
As a pilgrim of the city of God sharing the polis with citizens of the city of man, Augustine articulates a skeptical yet fervent engagement with the common good of man. Though the city of God and the city of man occupy the same space for a time, they have differing conceptions of the common good based on differing conceptions of eudaimonia. These conceptions necessitate different approaches to happiness: The city of man aims to pursue this through a reasoned pursuit of virtue; the City of God through the enjoyment of God. The cities, however, do overlap in their desire for prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice, but fail to define these terms in similar ways. The city of man is ill-equipped to determine justice and goods for its people. Thus, the Augustinian loves his polis, not because he hopes to gain anything from it, but because it is a natural outpouring of his love for God. The Augustinian, motivated by love and not self-betterment, bears responsibility to love his neighbor by active participation within the earthly society, seeking true virtues. He must not dare hope in the common good of the state, but he cannot abandon it.
[1] This surge seems to have begun with Hannah Arendt. Love and Saint Augustine formed her later political work. Motifs of “Amor Mundi” (love of the world), “eternal citizenship,” and “the banality of evil,” permeate her political philosophy. Her influence is evident in the works John Milbank, Oliver O’Donnovan, and Jean Bethke Elshtain among others, as well as the rise of Augustinian dissertations immediately following Love and Saint Augustine’s English publication in 1996. [2] Patrick J. Deneen, “Foreword to the 2018 Edition,” in Augustine and the Limits of Politics, by Jean Bethke Elshtain, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press. 2018), xvii. [3] Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin Books. 1968), 3-16. [4] Jean Bethke Elshtain, Augustine and the Limits of Politics. (Notre Dame Press. 2018), 2. [5] Deneen, “Forword,” xix. [6] Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, trans. R.W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), XIX.17, 945. [7] Peter Brown, “Political Society,” in Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert A. Markus (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1972) 322-23. [8] Patrick J. Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 54. [9] John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. (Hoboken: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 401. [10] Veronica Roberts Ogle, “Augustine’s Ciceronian Response to the Ciceronian Patriot,” in Augustine’s Political Thought, by Richard J. Dougherty Rochester (University of Rochester Press, 2019), 201. [11] Augustine, The City of God, I.1, 4. [12] Joanna V. Scott, “Political Thought,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Press, 2009), 219. [13] Raymond Canning, “Common Good,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Press, 2009), 219. [14] John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 155 Similar definitions are offered by Waheed, Locke, and Rawls among others. See Hussain Waheed, "The Common Good," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2018). [15] Aristotle, Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair (New York: Penguin Classics, 1981), III.6 1278b, 186. [16] Augustine, City of God, XIV.28, 632. [17] Elshtain, Limits of Politics, 22. [18] Augustine, The City of God, XIX.16.24, 960 Peter Brown, “Political Society,” 17. [19] Aristotle, Politics, 20 [20] This claim relies on Aristotle’s commitment to reproduction as an essential component of natural life. See Aristotle, Politics, 1.2 1153a, 60. [21] Elshtain, Limits of Politics, 39. This is a contrast to Rawlsian theories which propose engaging in public life behind a “veil of ignorance,” leaving one’s personal convictions and loves behind. See Rawls, John Theory of Justice. 1971. [22] Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 105. [23] While I focus on the Aristotelian tradition, Platonic conceptions of a rational, political animal can be found in Plato, The Republic, 434d–441c, and369a-b, respectively. [24] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terrence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Press,1999), I.7. 1097b, 26. [25] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.7. 1098a, 3. [26] Aristotle, Politics, 1.1253a, 60. [27] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VII.12, 1152b, 115 [28] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1.7 1098a 3. [29] Aristotle, Politics 1.2, 1253a, 60. [30] Mary M. Keys, Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Promise of the Common Good, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 89. [31] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.8 1099a [32] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, IV.1-4 1119b-1124b, 49-74. [33] Aristotle, Politics, 7.6 1330a, 1–10; 1331a,8 19–25. [34] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. III.10 1158a, 13. [35] Keys, Common Good, 45. [36] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VIII.13 1162a-1164b, 134-13. It is worth noting that for Aristotle, friendship itself is a virtue worth seeking for non-utilitarian means, but this sort of friendship is egoistic and self-justified and does not justify concession for the common good as its pursuit. See Nicomachean Ethics, VIII. [37] New Natural Law theorists have argued that these goods prima facie justify political cooperation. However, I side with those who claim a polis requires a shared teleology for a sustainable common good. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, and Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? [38] Aristotle, Politics, III.4 1276a. [39] Raymond Canning, “Common Good Raymond Canning, “Common Good.” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Press. 2009.), 220. [40] Augustine, Letters, trans. Roland Teske (New York: New Advent Press, 2003), 181A. [41] Stephen J. Duffy, “Anthropology,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Press. 2009.), 27-29. [42] Bonnie Kent, “Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Saint Augustine, ed. Elenore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 241. [43] Roland J. Teske, “Soul,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Press, 2009), 414. [44] Tarsicius van Bavel, “Love,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Press, 2009), 510. [45] Kent, “Ethics,” 248. [46] Gerald W. Schlabach, “Ethics,” in Augustine Through the Ages. Ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans Press. 2009), 326. [47] Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine. Trans. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 6. [48] Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, 30. [49] Van Bavel, “Love,” 508. [50] Augustine, Teaching Christianity, trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City Press, 1996), I.11, 20. [51] Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, 36. [52] Augustine, Teaching Christianity, I.35,39, 128. [53] Gentry, Glenn. “Beyond Augustine the Ethical Structure of Community” (PhD diss., Baylor University. 2003), 112. [54] Augustine, City of God I.17-25; Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine, 32. [55] Nello Cipriani, “Ethics,” in Augustine Through the Ages, trans. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Press, 2001), 325. [56] Gentry, Beyond Augustine, 116. [57] Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, trans. Peter King (Indianapolis: Hackett Press,1993), I.8, 18; I.15.33-I.16.35; Augustine, On the Trinity, trans Edmund Hill. (New York: New City Press, 2015), VIII.10.14. [58] Augustine, City of God. 8.14. [59] Augustine, On the Trinity, XIV.14.18. [60] Elshtain, Limits of Politics, 22. [61] Canning, “Common Good,” 220. [62] Canning, “Common Good,” 219. [63] Michael P Foley, “The Other Happy Life,” in Augustine’s Political Thought, ed. Richard J. Dougherty (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2019), 42. [64] Augustine, City of God, XIX.I.4, 913-918. [65] Foley, “The other Happy Life,” 45. [66] Augustine, Morals of the Catholic Church, trans. Richard Stothert, (Lighthouse Publishing, 2017), 15.25 [67] Elshtain, Limits of Politics, 105 [68] Augustine, City of God, XI. 5. 858 [69] Elshtain, Limits of Politics, 37 [70] Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 103 [71] Augustine, On the Trinity, 12.15.24-25 [72] Ronald H. Nash, “Wisdom,” in Augustine Through the Ages: an Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Press, 2009), 886 [73] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.7 1098b1-8; I. 12-13,1101b35-1102a25 [74] Augustine, City of God, IX. 5, 858 [75] Augustine, City of God. XIX. 27. 963. [76] Brown, “Political Society,” 322-23 [77] There is irony in claiming an Augustinian call to peace. He is often critical of those who claim to bring earthly peace, noting “For Rome, peace is just another name for dominium.” See Elshtain Limits of Politics, 105 [78]Augustine, City of God. XIX. 27. 965. [79] Ogle, “Ciceronian Response,” 201. [80] Augustine, City of God, XIX.21. 950. [81] Augustine, City of God, II.19. 74. [82] Robert Dodaro, “Justice,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Press, 2009), 483 [83] Augustine, City of God, I.20 [84] Augustine, Letters, 100'
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