What is it the mind knows when it seeks to know itself? What is the faculty of the mind which is aware of itself? How does the mind store and recall memories? How does it recall false memories, and where do these come from? Such questions of conscious and introspection are crucial to understanding the ontology and functionality of the human mind. Traditionally, theories of the mind have fallen into two groups: physicalism and dualism. The physicalist claims that all mental properties are physical properties, that is, there is no non-physical substance concerning thoughts, emotions, or desires, but only physical properties and activities within the brain. The dualist on the other hand, advocates for such a non-physical entity, a mental state that exists independently of the physical body, which can freely orchestrate thoughts, memories, or desires. I analyze the Augustine’s understanding of memory and argue that the mind’s capacity for direct, subjective self-awareness suggests the reality of a non-physical conscience.
Memory and Epistemology
Augustines distinction of memory as central to the mind finds its root in On the Trinity, the Confessions, and The City of God. While Augustine explores the facets of the mind in order to draw trinitarian comparisons, my focus is on practical implications of these divisions for the philosophy of mind. The three facets of the memory Augustine describes correlate to three self-evident functions within the human mind: understanding, self-reflection, and animation.[1] Perhaps the most easily understood process of the three, understanding, is the mind’s perceived ability to keep record of data. Our minds have within them records of physical and mental events, stored for future recall. Memory, however, is more complicated, requiring not only the storage of propositional and experiential knowledge, but also the faculty of recalling such thoughts. This second-order mental faculty requires one to be aware of the mental properties within oneself, and then think on, and interpret these memories. The third faculty, animation, complicates things even further, not only requiring the second-order cognition of memory, but also the cognitive choice to act on this remembrance. Augustine provides detailed analysis of these three functions.
Before one can understand Augustine’s conception of the mind, it is important to form a rudimentary account of his epistemology and understanding of sensation. For Augustine, empirical sensation is always second to memory and introspection.[2] Following Plato, his epistemology claims illumination as the primary means of attaining knowledge. One does not base judgments on empirical sensation, but on one’s memory of these sensations.[3] This places the emphasis of knowledge on the one doing the knowing, not on the sensations themselves. One’s premier epistemic aim is to know oneself, not facts and realities of the external world. Therefore, Augustine is less concerned with empirical observations, and more interested in what these observations reveal about the observer. While empirical observations provide insight into the faculties of the senses, it is the memory of these empirical observations that offers true knowledge of one’s self.[4]
Memory is the central and defining function of the mind. It is not just a means to recall the past, but is also the seat of imagination and volition. Moreover, memory is the means by which one contemplates and connects truth. Man interacts with the past and the future through memory. One never considers the past in the past, but in the present. Even those events which are past, exist in the memory as present. We remember ourselves, as we were, in the past.[5] While time exists in a “before-after” relationship. It is the memory that takes this series of “before” moments and considers them past. Likewise, the memory speculates how the future might look like the past. The mind does not know the future, nor has it ever known the future, but it assumes the future will be like the past.[6] Still, neither the past nor the future exist. There is only the present, and the memory speculating about past moments and future possibilities.[7] Memory is how man makes sense of change and time.
Memory, for Augustine is the means by which one considers the past, claiming “it flies headlong a way out of the future into the past… the present itself has no length.”[8] He relies, therefore, on the memory to help make sense of his current state. Without memory, each present moment would be disoriented chaos. Man understands the present and future only by inferring that it will conduct like the past.[9] Moreover, when one speaks the words of a sentence, the first word is already gone, he is only remembering it; the sentence is meaningless without the memory to bind these words together.[10] Likewise, empirical observations have no coherent meaning without memory. It is memory, not the senses that connect my falling on the ground to the cut on my knee, to the pain in my mind. A conscious memory organizes these events in a meaningful way. Without memory, empirical sciences would be meaningless strands of sensory input. Memory is how one makes sense of empirical data.
Memory and the Self.
In addition to cataloging and interpreting sensory input, memory is the means by which one acts in any given instance, by storing and interpreting internal states associated with one’s experience of the world. Memory stores both the sensory and internal experiences one has. When a child experiences the fear of a dog, she is recalling not only her understanding of what a dog is, but also her past experiences with dogs and how those experiences made her feel. It is memory that correlates the past experience of an angry rottweiler with the current experience of a friendly golden retriever. The memory stores and associates one’s internal emotional states to simultaneous sensory input.[11]
Likewise, the memory recalls internal thoughts and propositional knowledge. Simple computations like finding the area of a triangle require recall of facts about triangles, mathematical formulas for interpreting those facts, and experiential memory of performing similar computations. For this reason, Augustine argues that true knowledge is found through introspection, not sensory study. One comes to understand the nature of triangles by memory and reason, not by looking at pictures of triangles.[12] It is within the memory that one understands truth and makes sense of the world.
Therefore, action depends on memory, not merely propositional knowledge. Action requires understanding of the past and its implications for the future; action requires an understanding of patterns and reasoning of internal emotional and intellectual propositions. Actions cannot be mere physical responses to sensory input. As we have seen, one must make sense of sensory input in a meaningful way; this only occurs through the memory. Responses to sensory input require mental awareness of past events and of one’s past and current mental states. These functions occur within the memory, making sense of both the sensory input, one’s own mental functioning, and imagining the future of possible outcomes, based on past experience.[13]
Perhaps the most important of these mental functions is the mind’s awareness and memory of its own functions. Not only does the mind store sensory experience and ideas acquired through teaching, but it also stores the emotional states and passions of the mind.[14] Memory, therefore, seems to be the seat of self-awareness: In the memory, we are conscious of the choices we have made and how they relate to choices we currently are making. The memory is in the mind, and yet the actions of the mind are found within the memory. According to Augustine, the memory is the function of the mind; it is the mind’s very essence and self.[15] There is no part or function of the mind which happens independently of memory. In the memory, the mind is aware of itself, its memories, and its actions.; it is the memory that allows one to consider their own sensations and consciousness. In the memory, we are aware of the self.
This self-awareness is crucial for making decisions involving affections or distastes. Making decisions is rarely a reflexive response to sensory stimuli. Rather, most decisions are conscious decisions: one takes into account one’s own self as the volitional agent and as the recipient of the consequences of a decision. When making decisions, one considers himself to be in the world he observe. One must consider his own role in the actions he makes. As a volitional agent, one must consider not only emotions and feelings, but also the moral and ethical repercussions of a decision. If one were merely responding to physical stimuli, ethics would be of no concern. Moral obligations of one’s actions only extend as far as one acts in a conscious choice. One cannot be faulted for a reflexive response to physical stimuli anymore than a tree could be faulted for falling when it is cut down. Moreover, ethical implications only extend to one who is aware of these conscious decisions. Moral culpability requires not only that one consciously choose, but also that one can deliberate and evaluate such choices. Additionally, true volitional actions demand that the deliberator is aware of their own volitional role. One does not make volitional choices for someone else; we are aware that we are the ones acting upon our desires. Humans make choices under the supposition that it is oneself making the choice. This requires both awareness of and direct access to one’s own mental states. As the memory is the mind directly reflecting upon itself, it is memory that allows us to make conscious actions.[16] Any legitimate volitional actions require a conscious and self-reflecting mind. Additionally, for any legitimate volitional action, one must rely on memory to believe that actions will occur in the same ways that actions have always occurred. In making volitional choices, the agent presupposes laws of nature, one’s own volitional ability, and the typical responses of other agents. This expectation of the future is an action of the memory, reflecting on the past and imagining a consistent future. It is self-reflective memory that allows humans to consider themselves to be volitional agents, make deliberate, conscious actions, and expect that these actions will occur in a manner consistent with the past.[17]
Memory and Ontological Simplicity
Thus far we have analyzed the roles memory plays in mental functioning. The memory catalogues and interprets sensory input, it is the means of intellectual understanding and synthesis, and it is crucial to one’s ability to make volitional choices. It is clear that memory is central to the human experience. At this point, however, one might be tempted to distinguish various parts within the mind, or even various minds or modes of the mind. There seem to be distinct faculties for storing data, interpreting data, feeling emotions, making choices, and representing the self. Such a distinction misses the centrality and importance the memory bears on the mind. Not only does the memory play a distinct role in every mental function, the memory unifies the mind into one simple subject.
The ontological simplicity of the mind is most easily seen in the functional diversity and integration of the memory. despite theories which attempt to isolate the memory solely within a specific section of the brain, it is evident that every cognitive function requires memory. It is important to note that one does not remember facts and experiences as 3rd person or “other” experiences. Rather, the human mind locates itself within the facts and processes of the brain. One’s sensory experiences, intellectual functions, emotions, and desires occur from a 1st person point of view. The mind says “I see, feel, think, choose.” The mind is self-aware that it is within the mental processes themselves. Moreover, the mind is aware of this 1st person perspective, and is able to analyze what is occurring within itself. There is a constant and direct reflecting of the brain upon itself. This second order cognition, or self awareness, makes the human mind unique in that we both remember and are aware of our memory: The human mind is directly aware of what occurs within the human mind. This awareness extends to all areas of thought and volition. Wherever the memory is, the mind is aware. Because this memory and awareness persist through all mental functions, it is clear that there is one simple mind, acting in various modes. The mind is integrated entirely, and conscious throughout.
Any discussion of the memory is incomplete without acknowledging its shortcomings. Memories frequently fail us. There appears to be something wrong in either the storing or recall of our memories. There is a disconnect in the chain between our sensations and our recall. This is common among one’s experiential memories, our recall of events and experiences; but is rare among factual memories and intellectual comprehension. It is more likely one will fail to remember mathematical rules than misremember them. Augustine claims this is because such principals are matters of truth, not fallen experience.[18] Here Augustine must articulate a non-physical mind. He claims that it is the physical body that wears away and declines, not the mind; if it were not for this physical limitation, the mind would never misremember. Thus, the mind remembers matters of pure truth, which are known in the non-physical mind, but misremember sensory experience, which is stored in the physical brain. Regardless of whether one accepts a dualist view, one must account for the obvious fallibility of the physical mind, and the disparity between what one forgets and what one misremembers. It seems the mind has a stronger affinity for immaterial truths than sensory experience.
Memory as non-physical
I have argued thus far for the systematic integration of memory within the mind’s mental functions, and the preeminence it holds in the understanding of experiences, the contemplation of ideas, and the volition of the will. I have attempted to show that the memory is essential for these functions as well as for the functions of self-reflection and second-order cognition of mental events. It is through the memory that one understands the self as the first-person I, and that one places themselves as a subject and volitional agent within the world. I now turn to the question of substance dualism. In this final section I argue that one cannot make sense of the memory as a merely physical system, specifically looking at the incoherence of functionalism and behaviorism.
The primary issue for any physical account of the mind is that of self-reflection. While discussions of the memory’s role in epistemology certainly raise difficulties for the physicist, the memory’s role in determining the 1st person, subjective I directly challenges the physcialism. It poses issues for the functionalist, in that they deny any dependence on internal mental states. It likewise challenges the behavioralist, in that behavioralist seeks to identify cognitive function by behaviors, but it seems there is a memory of introspective emotions and volitions that are incongruent with one’s actions.
The Augustinian account of the mind centers on the 1st person indexical I. In its collection and interpretation of sensory input, and its volitional choices, the memory is self-reflective. It thinks about itself. When one thinks of his mind he does not think of it like he does any other body part; he thinks of the mind as “I.” Man is aware that the mind is the seat of one’s consciousness and identity. Other body parts are mere parts, but the mind is the essence of one’s self. Furthermore, the mind reflects upon its thoughts through second order cognition. We are aware when and what we are thinking. There is no doubt that within the mind, the memory identifies and remembers a subjective, self-aware experience of the mind. We are aware of ourselves in distinct and unique ways. Only I truly know what occurs within my mind.
This causes great difficulty for the functionalist, who claim that “what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part.”[19] The existence of a first person I explicitly denies this. The functionalist cannot acknowledge the internal constitution of a self-aware person. They instead claim that any perceived I is the functional response to physical input. This is not the case. The mind’s ability to analyze itself suggests a consciousness of any mental functions. Even if one conceded that first order mental properties were functions, the second order analysis of these functions suggests that there is more than function; there is an I watching over and empowering these functions. If there were no I, one would have no awareness of one’s own 1st order mental states, as one’s own. There is, however, awareness of the personal possession of one’s own 1st order mental states, and it therefore, a 1st person I. Because this I is self-evidently aware, functionalism must either reduce or deny any 2nd order mental states.
The behavioralist faces a similar issue with the first person I. Behavioralism demands behavioral evidence for any psychological hypothesis.[20] For any mental state X, there must be a corresponding behavioral state X. Our memories, however, tell a different story. If one accepts that memory allows humans volitional power, it can be argued, that upon introspection, one might act in a way inconsistent with their initial mental state. If for instance, I am cut off and get angry, my initial behavioral response might be to espouse profuse profanity and honk my horn. However, if I remember that I am driving with my mother, and that such reactions have typically resulted in little satisfaction and lots of judgement, I may instead respond with a smile as if I were not bothered. The behavioralist must claim that I am not bothered, because I do not act bothered. My second-level cognition, however, tells a different story: I was angry and bothered. Furthermore, because I am directly present to my mental states, my subjective experience of my emotions is more valid than my mother’s experience of my behaviors. The behavioralist must then either reduce my internal states to behaviors themselves, or deny my 1st person awareness of my emotions.
I have attempted to provide a traditional account of the functions of the memory, in accordance with Saint Augustine. Through the understanding of the memory, Augustine argues for the mind’s capacity for direct, subjective self-awareness. For Augustine, memory is the central role of the mind, and the mind is the very essence of man. He suggests an epistemology of illumination, which focuses on one’s memories, rather than experiences, and argues for an ontologically simple mind. Such a prima facie account of the mind’s functions suggests the reality of a non-physical conscience. In particular, the mind’s constant introspection poses particular issues for the functionalist and behavioralist, who deny any non-physical account of contemplation. If the Augustine’s traditional understanding of memory is correct, the mind must exist as a non-physical self.
[1] Traditionally translated “understanding, love, and will,” I have adjusted the terms to better fit the subject at hand. See Cipriani, Nello, “Memory” in Fitzgerald, Allan D. Augustine Through the Ages: an Encyclopedia. Eerdmans Press. Grand Rapids, MI. 2001. p. 554 [2] Teske, Roland j. “Soul,” in Fitzgerald, Allan D. Augustine Through the Ages: an Encyclopedia. Eerdmans Press. Grand Rapids, MI. 2001 [3] Augustine, Aurelius The Confessions. New City Press. New York. 1998. Print. 10.11.12 [4] Augustine, Aurelius Explainations on The Psalms. “Ps 145.5.” New City Press. New York. 2003. [5] the Confessions. 11.13 [6] Ibid 12.4 [7] Ibid 11.20 [8] Ibid 11.21 [9] Augustine, Aurelius. The City of God. Random House. 1950 12.16 [10] Ibid 11.20 [11] Cipriani, Nello, “Memory” in Fitzgerald, Allan D. Augustine Through the Ages: an Encyclopedia. Eerdmans Press. Grand Rapids, MI. 2001. p. 554 [12] The Confessions. 7.10.16 [13] The Confessions 10.6.8 [14] Cipriani p.554 [15] The Confessions 10.17.26 [16] Augustine, Aurelius. On the Trinity 10.8. New City Press. New York, New York. 2015. Print [17] O’Daly, Gerald. Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind. University of California Press. 1982. P. 132 [18] On the Trinity 11.12 [19] Levin, Janet. “Functionalism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018. Web [20] Graham, George. “Behhavioralism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018. Web
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